Summary. In a PokerBros union, rake and settlements flow up from players to agents to super-agents to the union owner, while chips and credit flow down the same chain. Each layer keeps a share. A bot only profits if its backing agent can fund it and settle its winnings — so the agent hierarchy, not the app, is the real gatekeeper of integrity.
The four layers
A union is not one business; it is a stack of them sharing one player pool.
| Layer | Controls | Typical revenue | Integrity role |
|---|---|---|---|
| Union owner | The shared player pool and rules | A slice of total union rake | Sets policy, can expel a club |
| Super-agent | Several agents and their chip allocations | Rakeback override on downstream volume | Vouches for agents; absorbs blame for a bad one |
| Agent | A roster of players and their credit | Rakeback share + spread on credit | Knows players personally; first to spot odd money flow |
| Player | Their own seat | Their winnings (minus rake) | Generates the rake everyone above lives on |
How rake actually splits
The app deducts rake from pots. That rake does not vanish into a corporate cashier — it is redistributed back down the agent tree as rakeback, with each layer keeping an override. An agent might pass most rakeback to loyal players to keep them seated, taking a thin margin on huge volume; a super-agent earns on the combined volume of every agent beneath them. The whole structure is designed to maximise hands played, because hands played is what feeds rake.
Settlement is the choke point
Players rarely deposit or withdraw real money through the app. They settle with their agent — cash, transfer, or running credit. The agent settles up with the super-agent; the super-agent with the union owner. This off-platform settlement is exactly why bots and collusion are a money problem more than a software problem: a winning bot has to convert chips to cash through an agent who will be asked, every settlement cycle, why a particular account keeps winning.
Why this makes bots a weak strategy
Imagine a bot with a genuine 3 bb/100 edge in soft games. To matter it needs volume; volume means winning consistently; consistent winning in a small union is visible to the agent within a settlement cycle or two. The agent's choice is then to defend a robot they can't explain, or cut it loose. Most cut it loose, because their own standing with the super-agent is worth more than one suspicious account.
Collusion scales the problem but doesn't change its shape: more seats under one agent means more money the agent has to account for, and a clearer graph of chips moving toward one target. The structural defence is the same — accountability that climbs the same ladder the money does.
Turning this into an integrity model
The map above becomes useful when it is instrumented: tying settlement anomalies to agent rosters, scoring chip-flow toward suspected targets, and giving union owners a view of risk by agent rather than by player. That instrumentation is the practical side of this research, and it is what a structural integrity review delivers.